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Scratching the Corporate Back: Why
Corporations Have No Incentive to Define
Human Rights
Erin Elizabeth Macek"
Due to the increased globalization of the world economy,
corporations are more frequently expected to actively promote
and protect human rights in the countries within which they do
business. Spurring the call for such corporate morality is the
acknowledgement that, as government aid has decreased, the
private sector has become a primary source of finance for devel-
opment in many countries. As a result, while countries look to
corporations for investment, many analysts look to the same
corporations to champion human rights standards. Some corpo-
rations have responded to rising consumer and nongovernmen-
tal organization pressure regarding human rights abuses by
formulating codes of conduct. The vast majority of corporations,
however, have not pursued such efforts. While business and so-
cial responsibility should go hand in hand, an international en-
tity must take the initiative to define a corporation's specific
human rights responsibilities. Until this is done, corporations
will continue taking a piecemeal approach toward promoting
and protecting human rights in the countries in which they do
business.
This Note surveys the methods available to corporations for
protecting human rights and recommends that the duty of es-
tablishing and defining human rights standards applicable to
corporations should fall to the United Nations rather than the
corporations themselves. Part I discusses the traditional meth-
ods of promoting and protecting human rights and their relation
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to corporations, social responsibility, and human rights. Part II
details possible reasons a corporation would adopt a code of con-
duct and the shortcomings of such a code. Part III discusses the
economic reasons why a corporation will most likely choose not
to adopt a code of conduct voluntarily. The Note concludes by
suggesting that the United Nations is the international organi-
zation best suited to undertake the task of defining corporate
human rights responsibilities.
I. THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. STATE ACTION
Traditionally, most proponents of human rights felt that the
state was the actor primarily responsible for the protection of
such rights.' There are numerous means for states to provide
this level of protection. Individual state governments are ex-
pected to comply with "international obligations regarding
treatment of individuals and groups living within the state's
boundaries."2 Indeed, many individual governments signed the
United Nations International Bill of Human Rights, which in-
cludes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and have
taken steps to safeguard many of the basic human rights de-
tailed therein.3 For instance, many national constitutions guar-
antee citizens freedom of expression and of the press, freedom of
assembly, and the right to a fair trial, among other rights.4 A
1. See Barbara Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE, 153, 153 (1997); see also Su-Ping Lu, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the
FTC: Advancing Human Rights through Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 603, 606 (2000) (stating that the discussion on human rights tradi-
tionally centered on defining the role of the state actor in the protection of those
rights); Wesley Cragg, Human Rights and Business Ethics: Fashioning a New Social
Contract, at http'//www.yorku.ca/dreed/cragg.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2000) (de-
scribing a state's government as the focus of the United Nations Declaration of Hu-
man Rights).
2. Frey, supra note 1, at 155.
3. Cragg, supra note 1. See also Kimberly Gregalis Granatino, Corporate Re-
sponsibility Now: Profit at the Expense of Human Rights with Exemption from Li-
ability? 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 191, 199 (1999) (explaining that U.N.
members are obligated to uphold the human rights standards detailed in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights).
4. See id. (describing a number of steps governments have taken to promote
the protection of human rights such as passing anti-discrimination laws, aiding
refugees, providing health and unemployment insurance, and old age security).
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state may also use bilateral agreements to encourage other
states to respect basic human rights.5 The United States re-
fuses to grant Most-Favored Nation ("MFN") status to countries
with non-market economies that deny their citizens the right or
opportunity to emigrate.6 However, despite the outward ap-
pearance of commitment to human rights demonstrated by
many nations, the problem of human rights abuse remains. 7 As
a result, many human rights activists concluded that leaving
the protection of human rights solely to individual governments
is inadequate.8
B. CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights advocates now assert that corporations, par-
ticularly transnational corporations ("TNCs"), are the entities to
fill the human rights protection void left by the public sector.9
Because of globalization, many TNCs have greater power and
influence within certain countries than the respective national
governments. 10 This power and influence naturally stems from
wealth. Twenty-five percent of the world's productive assets are
controlled by the 300 largest TNCs. 11 Direct investment by
TNCs in developing countries is greater than both the inflows
from official aid and the net lending by international banks. 12
Furthermore, "the economies of most U.N. Member States are
5. See Frey, supra note 1, at 159 (noting that some countries consider the hu-
man rights practices of other countries when making bilateral political and economic
decisions).
6. 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1994).
7. See Frey, supra note 1, at 155-170 (stating that most of the legislative and
executive efforts in the United States to address transnational corporations and
human rights issues have failed to be enacted into law); see also Granatino, supra
note 3, at 223 (arguing that the U.S. government's reluctance to impose a mandatory
code thereby making corporations liable for human rights abuses implies that profit
outweighs the duty to abide by the international law of human rights).
8. Frey, supra note 1, at 155 (stating that "the monitoring of state action alone
does not address the rights of all victims").
9. Lu, supra note 1, at 603 (noting the shift in attention to transnational cor-
porations and their relationship to international human rights); see also ALAN
REDER, IN PURSUIT OF PRINCIPLE AND PROFIT 175 (1994) (stating that governments
have failed in the area of human rights and this puts the focus of protecting them on
corporations).
10. See Lu supra note 1, at 604 (noting that the growth of many TNCs has
taken away the power of many national governments).
11. Id.
12. Ann-Marie Erb-Leoncavallo, The Road from Seattle, UN CHRONICLE, Jan.
1, 2000 available at 2000 WL 25574281.
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smaller than the annual revenues of the largest TNCs."13
A corporation's wealth translates into power in a global
economy. Corporations have the increasing luxury of being se-
lective in deciding where to conduct business. 14 This option is
the result of the fact that many developing nations compete for
a TNC's investment decision. 15 In order to attract investment,
many nations, particularly developing ones, will acquiesce to a
corporation's needs. For example, many of these nations will es-
tablish a corporate-friendly legal environment. 16 As a result,
because of their size and power, TNCs have the potential to in-
fluence a country's social and economic policies. A TNC could
use its power to positively affect a country's international hu-
man rights practices by refusing to invest in or deal with coun-
tries violating human rights standards. 7
C. BUSINESS ETHICS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Despite the professed potential for a TNC to influence a
particular country's human rights practices, some commentators
reject placing such a burden on corporations. Economists like
Milton Friedman argue that a human rights victim should look
to government to alleviate human rights violations. 8 If accused
of being unsympathetic to a victim's plight, these economists
simply assert that corporations are not in the business of inter-
national human rights, but in making a profit. 9 The goal of the
13. Id.
14. See Cragg, supra note 1, at 6.
15. Frey, supra note 1, at 160 (stating that foreign investment from corpora-
tions is now highly desired).
16. See Cragg, supra note 1, at 6 (providing examples of ways to create a favor-
able legal environment such as minimizing labor or environmental standards or cre-
ating opportunities for corporations to avoid the tax and banking restrictions in
other countries). See also Frey, supra note 1 at 160 (stating many states compete for
the benefits of corporate investment).
17. See Lu, supra note 1, at 604-06 (arguing that a corporation's location deci-
sions can provide the impetus for change in countries desiring investment); Frey,
supra note 1, at 160 (noting the influential power a corporation has by virtue of its
investment decision).
18. Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolu-
tion?, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1963, 1977 (1996) (stating that the logical conclusion
of Friedman's view that the only social responsibility of business is to increase prof-
its within the rules of the game is that doing public good is the responsibility of gov-
ernment, not business).
19. See Patricia Werhane, Introduction in PROFIT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1
(Patricia Werhane & Kendall D'Andrade eds. 1985) (quoting Milton Friedman,
"There is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use its resources and
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the
[Vo1.11:101
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corporation is the maximization of profit for the benefit of its
shareholders, 20 therefore, any action resulting in a deviation
from this objective is improper because it decreases a share-
holder's return on his or her investment. 21 This theory limits a
corporation's social responsibility obligations to obey the law,
abide by prevalent ethical customs, and promote good public re-
lations. The primary focus of these activities, unlike promoting
human rights, is to contribute to profit maximization.22
A related argument asserts that corporations can meet both
profit and human rights goals through investment in countries
that exploit their resources. 23 The justification for this position
is that investment "sets in motion a chain of events that leads to
a more open society."24 Investment will stimulate the develop-
ment of a middle class that in turn may provide a government
with the funds necessary to increase the quality of life within a
state.25 Some commentators, however, feel the time it will take
to reach this result is too long, and more frequently link ethical
responsibilities, including the proactive protection of human
rights, to corporations. 26
"Business ethics" as a discipline began appearing in the
United States around 1960.27 Following a price fixing scandal in
the electrical industry, the Commerce Department established
the Business Ethics Advisory Council.2' The number of univer-
sity and college courses in business ethics soon multiplied as
rules of the game," which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without
deception or fraud); see also Ronald Cordeo, The Place of Profit in Business, in
PROFIT AND RESPONSIBILITY 267, 267 (Patricia Werhane & Kendall D'Andrade eds.,
1985) (quoting an automobile executive, "one thing you should understand... is
that our business is making money, not automobiles").
20. JOEL MAKOWER, BEYOND THE BOTOM LINE 30 (1994).
21. Id.
22. Cragg, supra note 1, at 3; see also REDER, supra note 9, at 175 (explaining
Milton Friedman's view that corporations that abstain from getting involved in
community issues such as human rights are behaving responsibly because diverting
resources away from profit-maximization "short-changes" the corporation's boss, the
stockholders).
23. Cassel, supra note 18, at 1980.
24. Id. at 1980. But see id. (stating that some governments would not use the
resulting revenues for positive purposes).
25. Id.
26. See Frey, supra note 1, at 153 (the article's title, "The Legal and Ethical
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the Protection of International
Human Rights" demonstrates this proposition).
27. Thomas F. McMahon, Socio-Ethical Issues: Two Conceptual Frameworks, in
PROFIT AND RESPONSIBILITY 17, 17 (Patricia Werhane & Kendall D'Andrade eds.,
1985).
28. Id.
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well.29 The main focus of these endeavors was the ethical prac-
tices of individual businessmen. 30 The 1964 Civil Rights Act
and subsequent legislation also contributed by characterizing
the corporation as an individual entity that was expected to be-
have in a socially responsible manner.31 The 1972 Watergate
scandal prompted individuals to not only investigate the corpo-
ration's responsibility, but also the executive or employee in
charge of making ethical decisions. 32 The modem view of busi-
ness and ethics examines both what a corporation ought to do
and the person responsible for implementation.33 Advocates for
business ethics, however, disagree about the precise social role
of corporations .34
Some advocates advance the notion that corporations need
only be socially responsive, not responsible. 35 Under this theory,
a corporation examines the environment within which it oper-
ates and reacts to those issues that measurably affect it.36 Take
for example a highly visible corporation that employs child la-
borers. If a large consumer group boycotts the corporation's
products and the company ceases employing children, it acts in
a socially responsive manner.37
Other proponents of social responsibility feel corporate obli-
gations are founded upon "ethical, or even legal, foundations,"
rather than consumer responsiveness. 38 The premise of this
theory is that there is a difference between rights of individuals
and power, with the former imposing an obligation on the corpo-
ration.39 For instance, a socially responsible corporation be-
lieves that it is an agent with responsibilities beyond the provi-
sion of goods and services. 40 Consequently, whether or not a
29. Id. at 17-18.
30. Id. at 18.
31. Id. at 18 (implying that laws such as the Clean Air Act, Federal Water Pol-
lution Act, and Toxic Substances Control Act led business courses to focus on the
obligations of corporations to society).
32. Id. at 19-20 (stating that ethical questions took the form of"who told whom
to do what?").
33. McMahon, supra note 27, at 26.
34. See id. at 20-21.
35. Id. at 24.
36. Id. at 21 (describing the need for corporations to forecast social change, and
react to their predictions).
37. See generally MAKOWER, supra note 20, at 30 (defining social responsive-
ness as the idea that companies had to be responsive to social demands in order to
survive).
38. McMahon, supra note 27, at 23.
39. Id.
40. See id.; see also MAKOWER, supra note 20, at 30 (highlighting the difference
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particular consumer group attempts to pressure a corporation is
insignificant, as the corporation will proactively promote indi-
vidual rights such as those found in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.41
Those individuals who stress the social responsibility of
corporations justify this position by emphasizing that TNCs, as
a result of the direct and indirect benefits of their investments,
are often more powerful than the country within which they are
doing business.42 An overarching response to Milton Friedman's
argument is that social responsibility accompanies power.
43
Profit is not disregarded; it is simply regarded as a single ele-
ment of a corporation's broader purpose."
As a result of the nature of business, many corporate deci-
sions have the potential to affect human rights.45 For example,
corporations can directly violate human rights through practices
such as maintaining sweatshop conditions or employing child
laborers.46 A chosen host country may violate the fundamental
rights of workers without engendering any repercussions from
the corporation or any other actor.47 Therefore, the promotion of
human rights would merely be another consideration factored
into the decision-making model of the corporation.
D. WAYS TO ADDRESS CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Because a corporation will only face legal liability if it dis-
obeys the domestic laws of the countries within which it does
business, outside corporate human rights regulation can be ac-
complished in three ways.48
between social responsibility and social responsiveness).
41. McMahon, supra note 27, at 23. See also Frey, supra note 1, at 163-64 (ex-
plaining the views of many commentators that corporations should take on human
rights responsibilities regardless of their impact on a corporation's operations).
42. See Frey, supra note 1, at 160.
43. MAKOWER, supra note 20, at 32-33 (presenting the view that social obliga-
tions automatically attach to powerful institutions such as corporations).
44. Id. at 31 (quoting Quaker Oats President Kenneth Mason that "making a
profit is no more the purpose of a corporation than getting enough to eat is the pur-
pose of life").
45. See Lu, supra note 1, at 604 (arguing that the power of TNCs places them
in an "influential position in the area of human rights.").
46. Id. at 605.
47. Id. at 608; see also Frey, supra note 1, at 163 (stating the corollary that
TNCs are protected from liability as long as they comply with the domestic laws of
the countries in which they are doing business).
48. See Lu, supra note 1, at 607 (explaining that under current conditions, a
corporation has no duty to protect human rights or to prevent the violation of human
2002]
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1. Direct Regulation
The country where the corporation is headquartered can
regulate the foreign activities of its corporations. 49 For instance,
the United States could apply domestic laws such as the Fair
Labor Standards Act to the activities of U.S. corporations over-
seas, pass legislation governing operations in specific hot-spot
countries, use trade embargoes on either specific goods or coun-
tries, or ban investment into countries where serious human
rights violations go unchecked.50 As a method of forcing corpo-
rations to be socially responsible, direct regulation appears to be
inadequate and subject to a great deal of criticism.51 One of the
most relevant criticisms is that "extraterritorial application of
U.S. law is limited by its inapplicability to foreign producers and
governments that violate human rights."52
2. International Regulation
A second alternative to consider is international regulation
of corporate activities relating to human rights. For example,
the International Labor Organization (ILO) focuses on the pro-
motion of human rights mainly through developing and
monitoring compliance with international labor standards.5 3
Both the efforts of the ILO and a similar organization, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), are criticized for the limited scope of their business
guidelines. 5 4  Yet the premier international policing
rights by others).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Developing countries resist corporations being subject to laws other than
their own because provisions are not made for the difference in custom and economic
circumstances. Also, it is extremely difficult to pass legislation that purports to
regulate corporate activities in foreign nations because of the power and influence of
many affected corporations. Id; see also Frey, supra note 1, at 158 (stating that the
U.S government may ban U.S. corporate investment in countries considered to be
serious human rights violators).
52. Lu, supra note 1, at 610.
53. Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Promoting International Respect for Workers Rights
Through Business Codes of Conduct, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1, 2 (1993); see also
Cassel, supra note 18, at 1970 (stating that the ILO in conjunction with 159 member
nations works to reach agreements between business and labor).
54. Cassel, supra note 18, at 1970 (maintaining that both the ILO and the
OECD only reaffirm the longstanding rights of workers to organize unions, to bar-
gain collectively, and to non-discriminatory employment); Granatino, supra note 3,
at 204 (explaining that the ILO has no authority to enforce labor rights and human
rights agreements, but derives power to affect corporations by access to the public
through the media and corresponding notification to ILO officials).
[Vol.ll:101
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Yet the premier international policing organization, the United
Nations, has been unable to develop a code of conduct for multi-
national enterprises.5 The difficulty in developing interna-
tional human rights standards for corporations is underscored
by the fact that none have been adopted.
56
3. Private action
Private groups of human rights advocates can also aid in
the development of standards; however, the results of their ef-
forts are often limited in scope. For example, The Sullivan
Principles 57 were directed at corporations engaged in business in
South Africa. Initially proposed to deflect calls for divestment
from the region, the principles demanded firms cease discrimi-
natory employment, pay fair wages, provide workers benefits,
etc.58 At one point, 125 companies became signatories of the
principles and agreed to abide by them.5 9 Ultimately, the prin-
ciples were credited with desegregating hundreds of enterprises,
educating and training approximately 50,000 workers per year,
and increasing investment in the infrastructure of Black and
educational desegregation in South Africa.60 Despite this com-
mitment to corporate social responsibility toward human rights,
the principles were unsuccessful in reaching the ultimate goal of
55. Id. (stating that the United Nations attempted for a period of ten years to
develop a code of conduct for multinational enterprises); cf Frey, supra note 1, at
155 (discussing the role of the United Nations in protecting human rights and con-
cluding that its lack of success in protecting human rights has been partially due to
the organization's belief that individual governments are responsible for human
rights).
56. Frey, supra note 1, at 159-60 (stressing that the reaction to international
regulations regarding corporate responsibility for human rights would be less than
positive because currently, many countries are wary of the international control
model).
57. The following discussion details one such effort that was limited to corpora-
tions doing business in South Africa. Another regional effort was the MacBride
Principles, which were targeted toward U.S. corporations doing business in North-
ern Ireland. The principles aim to combat discrimination in the workplace. Id. at
174-77; see also Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling
Schemes: the Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights
through Private Initiatives, 30 LAW & POLY INT'L BuS. 111 (1998).
58. Cassel, supra note 18, at 1970-71.
59. Frey, supra note 1, at 175.
60. Id. See also Liubicic, supra note 57, at 111 (stating that because the results
of the audits were made public, the principles established a new standard for in-
vestment decisions by institutional investors, many of which looked to Sullivan com-
pliance records in making investment decisions).
2002]
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ending apartheid in the country.61 Therefore, while private ac-
tion may produce some success, it cannot be relied upon to make
substantial international headway.
II. CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT
Increasingly over the past thirty years, corporations have
individually addressed human rights issues by adopting "global
human rights codes of conduct and policies for their operations
and contractors." 62 While fewer than ten percent of U.S. based
multinational corporations have such codes, the number is in-
creasing.63 There are many reasons given for these corporate
initiatives, but the main motive discussed at great length in
scholarly literature on the subject is consumer pressure.64
Consumer pressure provides an incentive for a corporation
to voluntarily adopt a code of conduct because "there is a de-
mand curve for labor standards that reflects the additional
amount consumers will pay for products made under decent
conditions."65 Essentially, some consumers will boycott goods
61. See Cassel, supra note 18, at 1971. Proponents of the MacBride Principles
have also faced difficulties in reaching their goals. In large part, the corporate
community has not accepted them due to the lack of public pressure. In addition,
many people in Northern Ireland were concerned the principles would deter invest-
ment into the country that in turn would hurt the economy and actually increase
sectarian tensions. See Frey, supra note 1, at 176.
62. Cassel, supra note 18, at 1972; see also Frey, supra note 1, at 177-80 (pro-
viding examples of companies such as K-Mart and Timberland that have formulated
minimum standards regarding conditions of employment for their workers and those
of their business partners, civil and political rights, and investment criteria); see also
Lu, supra note 1, at 611 (finding that over 100 companies have voluntarily adopted
codes of conduct dealing with issues such as child labor, foreign investment criteria,
forced labor, and protection of civil and political rights).
63. Cassel, supra note 18, at 1972 (claiming that there is an increase in the use
of human rights codes of conduct).
64. See Lu, supra note 1, at 613 (explaining codes of conduct are an asset in
public relations with consumers as they value purchasing goods from human rights
friendly corporations.); see also Frey, supra note 1, at 159 (stating that socially con-
scious consumers can exert pressure that has an impact on corporate profits); Pas-
chal Zachary, Multinational Can Aid Some Foreign Workers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24,
1995, at Al (stating that "perhaps the main reason companies are adopting volun-
tary labor codes is that their public image, which is important to their business, is at
stake."); but see FT McCarthy, Doing Well by Doing Good: Anti-Globalisation Pro-
testers See Companies as Unethical as Well as Exploitative. Firms Demur, of course,
But Face an Awkward Question: Does Virtue Pay?, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 22, 2000
(providing at least one example where media attention did no lasting damage to a
corporation's share price or sales after a brief decrease in market share).
65. Liubicic, supra note 57 (providing an illustration of consumer purchasing
behavior in a human rights context).
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produced by a corporation whose practices violate basic human
rights standards. 66 Even if the real offender is the host country
and not the corporation, consumers may react negatively toward
the corporation. 67
However, consumers will only purchase human rights
friendly "Product A" at a higher price if informed of the human
rights violations of the company making "Product B."68 Addi-
tionally, for most individual purchases, consumers are not in-
formed of the conditions under which the product was made.69
Even if consumers possess relevant information, there is a limit
to the amount one can take into account, especially considering
the lack of coherence among different codes of conduct.70
Another criticism of corporate codes of conduct is that those
corporations who are not dependent on brand image and good-
will to sell their product lack the incentives to adopt and adhere
to a code of conduct. 71 Additionally, most corporations use in-
ternal auditors to assess compliance with the code. 72 Further-
more, the majority of voluntary initiatives do not provide for
public disclosure of violations should they occur.73 Finally, non-
66. Cassel, supra note 18, at 1968 (describing the reaction of consumers to in-
formation that a Gap contractor in El Salvador forced employed sweatshop condi-
tions at its factories); see also McCarthy supra note 64 (asserting that in the CNN
world, customers are apt to learn of corporate behavior making business vulnerable
to hostile campaigns).
67. Frey, supra note 1, at 159 ("An additional and very important factor is the
push by consumers... for corporate management awareness of human rights abuses
in the countries in which they do business. Raising the visibility of human rights
issues with consumers may be an effective tool for changing the behavior and poli-
cies of TNCs"); see also Granatino, supra note 3, at 214 (stating that media attention
examining a host country's non-compliance with human rights standards raises con-
sumer awareness).
68. Liubicic, supra note 57; see also Lu, supra note 1, at 624 (discussing a sur-
vey which reported that fifty-eight percent of consumers said that they would boy-
cott a brand if they knew that the company was employing children to make their
product and eighty-four percent of consumers would pay extra if the product was
manufactured in a worker-friendly environment).
69. Id. (reasoning that codes of conduct will give consumers the information
necessary to make an informed human rights purchase).
70. Liubicic, supra note 57 (quoting Richard Rothstein, "Without greater coher-
ence, corporate codes are unlikely to significantly influence Third World labor stan-
dards").
71. See id. (explaining that corporations which sell raw materials and compo-
nents or end use goods that do not derive value from brand or corporate image have
nothing to fear from the effects of media and consumer pressure).
72. Id. (providing three reasons this method of monitoring is questionable: (1)
conflict of interest problem, (2) auditors may not have adequate skills or training, (3)
workers may not aid with the audit).
73. Id.
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compliance does not translate into any significant corporate le-
gal liability.7 4
Despite the criticisms, the most obvious incentive for a cor-
poration to adopt a code of conduct is if it resulted in an increase
to the bottom line.75 Many commentators stress that social re-
sponsibility and profitability can coexist.76 However, at least
one company has found difficulty combining profit and human
rights. 77 Levi Strauss & Co. eventually succumbed to economic
pressures by taking advantage of cheap labor overseas where
"working conditions bordered on the sub-human." s8 Thus, im-
plementation of a code of conduct does not signal a decrease in
concern for profit.79 In fact, a survey for Management Account-
ing indicated that many respondents felt more pressure to in-
crease earnings when the company had a written code of con-
duct.8 0
74. Lu, supra note 1, at 614. Two U.S. Federal Courts imposed liability on two
corporations despite each having an established code of conduct. However, the au-
thors noted that the court in one case allowed the jury to take into account whether
the company "acted diligently in the promulgation, dissemination, and enforcement
of an antitrust compliance program in an active good faith effort to ensure that the
employees would abide by the law." An effective code of conduct is tailored to the
core principles of the corporate culture, communicated to affected employees, and
most importantly enforced by among other things, penalizing the manager responsi-
ble for the specific violation. Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Why a Corpo-
rate Code May Not Protect You, ACROSS THE BOARD, May 1990 at 24-5; McCarthy,
supra note 64 (discussing U.S. federal sentencing rules which allow judges to reduce
fines in cases involving companies that had rules in place to promote ethical behav-
ior, and to increase them from those that did not).
75. REDER, supra note 9, at 1 (noting profit is the main priority of business).
76. Id. (discussing the success of many socially responsible mutual funds, in
particular the fact that most of the them have outperformed the average funds in
their investment category over the long term and drawing the conclusion that one
reason many companies are doing well is due to their socially responsible policies);
see also McCarthy, supra note 64 (stating that one reason Shell rewrote its business
principles was because it was worried about the long-term impact of socially irre-
sponsible behavior); Granatino, supra note 3, at 198 (explaining that the economic
potential in China convinced many corporations to both continue their business in
the country and adopt codes of conduct aimed at improving human rights condi-
tions).
77. Peter McKenna, Human Rights and the Jean Business Don't Seem to Make
for a Good Fit, NATIONAL POST, Sept. 2, 2000 (reviewing Levi Strauss & Co.'s pro-
gressive human rights policies which were discarded in the late 1990s when sales
and profit margins considerably decreased and stating that "people are more likely
to reach for a lower-priced product than one stamped with 'Guarantee: Manufac-
tured Without Child Labour").
78. Id.
79. See Anne J. Rich et al., Are Corporate Codes of Conduct Effective?,
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING, Sept. 1990 at 35.
80. Id.
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Globalization has brought corporations a great opportunity
to expand production of their products and increase profits.,, It
has also brought "companies into contact with other countries
that do business by different rules."8 2 In making tactical deci-
sions, a corporation has to consider its competition.83 Corpora-
tions may worry that implementing codes of conduct will force
them to operate less efficiently than their competitors. s4 It may
also be difficult for a corporation to justify enforcing their stan-
dards in countries where ethical standards differ from those of
its home country.85
III. REGULATION OF CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS
BEHAVIOR
A. WHY NOT TO ADOPT A VOLUNTARY CODE OF CONDUCT
The basic problem faced by a company that decides to adopt
a code of conduct is that its competition may not play by the
same rules.86 If codes of conduct could be empirically linked to
the bottom line, the question of whether to adopt one would es-
sentially be moot. Many commentators state that codes of con-
duct increase profit, but the foundation for such statements is
often nonexistent.8 7 Indeed, it is very difficult to isolate and in-
vestigate any individual component of the profit equation.88
Most commentators support this theory by offering examples of
profitable corporations that make socially responsible decisions,
such as adopting codes of conduct.89 These examples are prob-
81. See McCarthy, supra note 64.
82. Id; see also Another Audit in Your Future?, JOURNAL OF BUSINESS
STRATEGY, May 1, 1996, available at 1996 WL 10928525 (stating that in dealing
with suppliers and distributors being too aggressive is counterproductive).
83. McCarthy, supra note 64 at 65 (asserting that competitive pressures force
firms to treat their employees differently than they otherwise would).
84. Lu, supra note 1, at 617 (stating that for every corporation which makes a
socially responsible decision based on a code of conduct, there is another corporation
willing to do what it takes in order to take advantage of a business opportunity).
85. See McCarthy, supra note 64, at 66 (explaining the proposition that Ameri-
can business people are more "ethically sensitive" than those of many other coun-
tries).
86. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
87. MAKOWER, supra note 20, at 67 (acknowledging the present lack of any em-
pirical evidence that socially responsible programs are successful in business terms).
88. MANUEL G. VELASQUEZ, BUSINESS ETHICS: CONCEPTS AND CASES, 39 (1998)
(stating that many factors affect profitability).
89. See id. (listing the following examples of profitable companies with long-
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lematic because the definition of socially responsible is malle-
able and profit can be measured in a number of different ways.9°
Even so, some commentators point to those corporations
that enacted codes responding to consumer pressure as evidence
of the effect a corporation's irresponsible social behavior has on
profit.9 1 The argument appears very simple. The consumer is
the nexus between a corporate code of conduct and profit. If
there were no causal link between consumer pressure, and
adopting a code of conduct dictating socially responsible stan-
dards for companies to abide by and profit, the company would
ignore negative consumer reaction and continue with present
actions. This argument may have merit when in the short-
run;92 in the long run, however, it is subject to criticism.9 3
Consumers must be aware of a corporation's behavior before
they can respond, and most consumers do not have such infor-
mation.94 Indeed, even with information on human rights viola-
tions, consumers do not respond to every offense. 95 If a con-
sumer backlash does occur, it will likely be short-lived. The
media is often the instrument from which consumers derive
their information, and as with most news events, the spotlight
will eventually fade. 96 Consumer reaction in the short-term may
have detrimental consequences, but over time the actions that
provoked the response will likely be forgotten. Ultimately, de-
veloping a code of conduct is expensive and is likely to decrease
profits to shareholders. 97
standing ethical cultures: "[c]ompanies that have combined a good history of profit
with exemplary ethical standards include: Xerox, Home Depot, Odwalla, Hewlett-
Packard, Digital Equipment, Silicon Graphics, Levi Strauss, Monsanto, Polaroid,
Patagonia, Johnson & Johnson, and Starbucks Coffee").
90. VELASQUEZ, supra note 88, at 39; see also MAKOWER, supra note 20, at 66
("[there are many "bottom lines"-pre-tax profits, return on assets, stock price, re-
turn on equity, sales growth, earnings-to-assets ratio, and many more").
91. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
92. Granatino, supra note 3, at 214-15 (citing the voluntary adoption of codes of
conduct by companies doing business in China as evidence that consumer pressure
can impact corporate profits).
93. Id.
94. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
95. Lu, supra note 1; see also Apparel: Labor Activists Urge Holiday Shoppers
to Raise Issue of Sweatshops with Retailers, BNA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH DAILY, Dec. 2, 1997 (reporting that TNCs continue to use child labor and
sweatshop practices).
96. Granatino, supra note 3, at 214-15 (explaining that the media raised con-
sumer knowledge of corporate conduct in China, which forced U.S. corporations to
deal with issues of corporate responsibility).
97. Mark B. Baker, Private Codes of Corporate Conduct: Should the Fox Guard
the Henhouse, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 399 (1993) (discussing the costs in-
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Socially irresponsible behavior of a corporation should not
be condoned, but in the current global climate there is no long-
term incentive for a corporation to adopt a code of conduct. A
code would arguably provide consumers with the necessary in-
formation to make a purchase based on the human rights stance
of a corporation. It would also, however, constrain the corpora-
tion from taking advantage of the opportunities its competitors
are able to pursue.98 Levi Strauss faced this problem and ulti-
mately implemented some of the practices its code of conduct
outlawed.9 9 The economics prisoners' dilemma'00 explains a cor-
poration's decision not to implement a code or to entirely aban-
don the code adopted in order to pursue higher profits. The ba-
sic conclusion of the prisoners' dilemma is that a "rational, self-
interested person should be unethical in business when there is
something to be gained through unethical behavior."10 If all the
corporations in a given industry adopted and adhered to a code
of conduct, they would all realize higher profits than if codes
were selectively implemented. 102 However, if the circumstances
allow for one corporation to maintain a competitive advantage
by not adopting a code of conduct, the more rational decision for
a corporation focusing on the bottom line is to refrain from doing
so. 1°" If one corporation pursues this route, it is only rational for
other corporations to follow suit. 0 4
Current conditions provide an environment conducive to
volved in implementing a code).
98. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 88 and accompanying text; see also Lance Compa & Tashia
Hinchliffe-Darricarrre, Enforcing International Labor Rights through Corporate
Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 686 (1995) (describing Levi
Strauss' use of child labor, unsafe condition, and unpaid wages at a supplier plant).
100.
Corporation B adopts the Corporation B does not
same code as A adopt a code
Corporation A A's profit is $3 M A's profit is $2 M
adopts the same B's profit is $3 M B's profit is $4 M
code as B
Corporation A A's profit is $4 M A's profit is $1.5 M
does not adopt a B's profit is $2 M B's profit is $1.5 M
code
VELASQUEZ, supra note 88, at 41 (providing a description of the prisoners' dilemma).
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Id; see also Baker, supra note 97 (admitting that corporations who develop
and enforce an internal code of conduct face a potential decrease in profits due to
competitive forces).
104. VELASQUEZ, supra note 88, at 41.
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placing codes of conduct issues far behind profit issues. Corpo-
rations not dependent on brand image or goodwill to sell prod-
ucts are immune from even the short-term consumer pressures
that corporations not similarly situated may take into ac-
count.105 Therefore, there is an entire group of corporations that
have incentives to follow the lead of the competition even if it
means being socially irresponsible. 10 6 The result is the same
even for those corporations dependent on brand-image.
There will always be "companies and individuals that take
advantage of the goodwill of others to make a quick profit."0 7
Because codes are voluntarily adopted, the corporation has com-
plete control over its content.108 Furthermore, most corporations
internally monitor compliance with their codes. 109 This self-
regulation "does not assure compliance or resolution because the
codes lack the necessary accountability to a third party.""0
Most importantly, simply disregarding provisions within the
code of conduct will not render a corporation liable under cur-
rent legal regimes.' The flexibility a corporation has in choos-
ing code provisions combined with the lack of repercussions re-
sulting from ignoring them will result in a continual
downgrading of human rights." 2
Viewing the problem from an individual employee's per-
spective reinforces the conclusion drawn from the prisoners' di-
lemma analysis. 13 Ultimately, without profits, corporations will
cease to exist. Employees are hired to aid the corporation in
reaching the profit maximization goal. Therefore, each em-
ployee has a personal incentive to make decisions that aid in the
maximization of profit and a code of conduct does not change a
corporation's expectations of its employees." 4 Financial pres-
105. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
106. See id.
107. Andrew Bartlett & David Preston, Can Ethical Behavior Really Exist in
Business?, J. Bus. ETHICS, Jan. 1, 2000 at 199.
108. Granatino, supra note 3, at 221 (noting that the current regulation through
corporate codes of conduct is voluntary and corporations develop their own codes).
109. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
110. Granatino, supra note 3, at 221.
111. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also Frey, supra note 1, at
163 (stating that a corporation is not going to be held to have violated international
law as long as it is complying with the domestic laws of the country within which it
is doing business).
112. Lu, supra note 1, at 617 (describing a situation such as this as a race to the
bottom).
113. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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sures do hinder employee compliance with codes of conduct.115
Employees may feel forced to make decisions that contribute to
the bottom line at the expense of social responsibility when de-
manded by the corporation. 1 6 This scenario is more likely made
when the employee has little empirical data indicating a socially
responsible decision will actually lead to long-term profit
gains.117 In fact, "pressure for short-term results was one of the
main threats to business ethics perceived by managers."118 Con-
sequently, if the competition is gaining advantages from the
pursuit of socially irresponsible practices, an individual em-
ployee may implement a similar plan despite condemnation of
the action in the corporation's code of conduct. 1 9 In addition,
research indicates that codes of conduct do not help individuals
resolve ethical dilemmas. 20 For example, most managers would
say that using child laborers is unethical without consulting a
code of conduct. Therefore, a code of conduct serves little use as
a decision-making tool.
Even studies investigating the link between social responsi-
bility tactics like codes of conduct and profit have produced less
than conclusive results. Some studies did find a positive link
between socially responsible behavior and profit; however, oth-
ers found no such link.121 No study has found that socially re-
sponsible behavior decreases profit. 22 Despite this, companies
such as Levi Strauss might wish to argue with this result.123
Levi Strauss is well known as a socially responsible company,
but, "the integrity of [its] ethical tradition was severely tested
by financial deterioration at the end of the 1990's."124
115. Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559,
1632-33 (1990).
116. Id. at 1632 n. 430; see also Bartlett, supra note 107 (stating that employees
often perceive the ultimate choice as being between profitable success or failure
rather than between good and bad business practices).
117. MAKOWER, supra note 20, at 94 (suggesting that signs of short-term com-
petitive disadvantages force managers to choose profit over social responsibility).
118. Bartlett & Preston, supra note 107.
119. MAKOWER, supra note 20, at 94 (reasoning that a major disincentive for a
manager to act socially responsible is because the corporation may face a competi-
tive disadvantage in the short-term).
120. Rich et al., supra note 79, at 35 (stating that a corporation should focus at-
tention on creating an overall ethical atmosphere).
121. Id. at 40; see also McCarthy, supra note 64 (stating that proving a causal
link between responsible corporate ethics and profitability is "well-nigh" impossible).
122. Id.
123. See McKenna, supra note 77.
124. KARL SCHOENBERGER, LEVI'S CHILDREN 169 (2000).
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Due to the lack of any concrete data on a link between social
responsibility and long-term profit, it is not surprising that few
corporations have adopted codes of conduct. 125 They are expen-
sive to implement, incentives from consumer pressure wane
over time, competitive advantage decreases, and individual em-
ployee concerns can result in noncompliance. The corporation
that adopts a code of conduct will generally find itself at a com-
petitive disadvantage. 12 6
Furthermore, a corporation with a code of conduct may find
itself at a legal disadvantage. Contrary to the views of many
corporate executives, establishing a code of conduct may not di-
minish or eliminate corporate liability from wrongs committed
by its employees. 27 Therefore, while the code is a social respon-
sibility signal to those consumers paying attention, it is unlikely
legal benefits will accrue as well. 28 Courts in the United States
generally adhere to common law principles that do not relieve
employers from liability based on an employee's acts even if the
employer has given instructions that proscribe the acts.129 Fur-
thermore, the code may give the party bringing the suit an addi-
tional weapon. A plaintiff or prosecutor could logically argue
that the company should be held liable because the act falls be-
low a standard set by the company itself.130 Regardless of legal
liability, the corporation that disregards its own standards also
signals its basic untrustworthiness and in the end, appears
more unethical than a corporation without a code of conduct. 13'
Therefore, few tangible benefits are associated with codes and
"few companies rationally will welcome the additional costs and
burdens of the special compliance programs that ineluctably ac-
company this adoption."32
B. WHY AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATING INSTITUTION IS
NEEDED
The fact that the costs of implementing voluntary codes of
125. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
126. MAKOWER, supra note 20, at 30 (quoting Milton Friedman who argued that
"companies that did adopt responsible attitudes would be faced with more binding
constraints than companies that did not, rendering them less competitive.")
127. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 115, at 1560. This assumes a company
could be held liable for its human rights abuses.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Pitt & Groskauftnanis, supra note 74, at 23.
131. Baker, supra note 97, at 421.
132. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 115, at 1560.
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conduct appear to outweigh the benefits does not imply that
corporations should not be held accountable for human rights
violations, but that they have very few incentives to attack the
problem individually. Standards must be set and enforced by an
outside entity. 133 Even some socially responsible corporations
such as Patagonia believe that ultimately laws and regulations
are necessary.134
Economic analysis can aid in the determination of what en-
tity is best situated to address an international legal problem
such as promoting and protecting human rights. 135 Institutions
to consider include the market itself, domestic legislatures, ad-
judicatory bodies, or international rule-making bodies. 136 The
commodity in the international legal context that is "traded" is
power in the form of governmental regulatory authority.137 The
incentive behind participation in the international regulating
market is that there are gains to be made from exchange. 138 For
example, one state's environmental laws may cause an adverse
effect in another state because the first state's law permits pol-
lution to flow to other states.139 The affected state will attempt
to change the first state's regulation. 40 One way to accomplish
this goal would be through institutionalization. 141 By allowing a
133. Jeremy Lehrer, Trading Profits for Change, 25 HUM. RTS. 21, 23 (1998)
("[E]veryone seems to agree that government-enforced regulations are the best
means of preventing industry abuses.") See also Erb-Leoncavallo, supra note 12 at
29-30 (providing opinions from two top UN advisors to the Secretary-General that
international institutions can protect human rights in this era of globalization better
than the current national rules and regulations). See generally Cassel, supra note
18, at 1978-80 (stating that where a corporation's self-interest is not manifest, out-
side assistance such as standards promulgated by an international entity may pro-
vide the necessary incentive).
134. Id. See e.g., REDER, supra note 9, at 12 (placing Patagonia in the category
of successful socially responsible businesses). See also Granatino, supra note 3, at
221 (arguing that mandatory, uniform, and aggressively regulated human rights
codes of conduct would ensure corporate compliance with international law). C.f,
Liubicic, supra note 56 (asserting that individual voluntary codes of conduct are in-
effective and that the workplace conditions need to be treated as public goods and
removed from the free market).
135. Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International
Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1999).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 13-14 (declaring that international law focuses on the definition, ex-
change, and pooling of governmental regulatory authority).
138. Id. (explaining that if no gain resulted from a trade, there would be no
trade).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 13-14.
141. Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 135, at 14-15 (defining institutionalization
as a process which involves the transfer of power over time through a treaty or an
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treaty or an international organization to regulate an aspect of
its affairs, a state relinquishes power over this particular aspect
but gains uniformity.
Another gain often realized from trading regulating power
in the international market is the realization of economies of
scale. 142 The globalization of the world economy arguably pro-
vides the opportunity for economies of scale to be realized from
the international regulation of human rights issues that relate
to corporations. 143 The competitive risk an individual corpora-
tion takes when adopting conduct codes allows greater efficien-
cies to be attained from coordinated rule making, surveillance,
and enforcement activities.'" If a single organization or treaty
governed corporate human rights conduct, the consequences of
non-compliance would be predictable, and the regulatory dis-
harmony that currently exists would be minimized. 145
Asset specificity, uncertainty, and complexity present in the
areas of business and human rights are also elements that indi-
cate an international rule-making body should be the entity in
charge of defining the human rights responsibilities of corpora-
tions. 146 As asset specificity, uncertainty, and complexity in-
crease, the need to transfer regulatory authority to an interna-
tional institution also increases. 147  A transaction is asset
specific when one actor "advances consideration at a particular
point in time and must rely on one or more other [actors] to
carry out their end of the bargain at a later point in time, or else
experience a significant loss in its expected value."148 Examin-
ing an industry in which a number of corporations adhere to an
industry-wide code of conduct serves as an example. 149
One corporation may take action to implement the stan-
dards embodied in the code, believing other corporations will do
the same. Such steps may involve extensive organization and
modification of current business practices, which would be diffi-
cult to reverse in the short-term. If a rival corporation wishes to
international organization).
142. Id. at 16.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. (stating that regulatory disharmony results in inefficiencies).
146. Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 135, at 36 (declaring that international
organizations can be the best approach to dealing with the allocation of some types
of rights).
147. Id. at 41.
148. Id. at 40.
149. Id. at 41 (stating that there are many circumstances in international rela-
tions contexts where asset specificity exists).
[Vol.ll:101
CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
disregard the code of conduct, it will be difficult for the first cor-
poration to respond, especially if the nature of the code allows
for easy defection. 50 Therefore, the socially responsible com-
pany is left adhering to a disadvantageous code. A corporation
can achieve a competitive advantage by disregarding the code of
conduct after others in the industry change their relative posi-
tions, leaving the other corporations at a competitive disadvan-
tage. As a result, there is a need for binding regulation from an
institutional organization. 151
Regulation of corporate human rights conduct is highly un-
certain in the sense that it is not only difficult to identify, but
also to define.152 The task of defining human rights standards is
complex as corporations deal with one another extensively in
the marketplace, competing for government contracts, suppliers,
and retailers. In addition, governments often have divergent
views on the relationship between business and social responsi-
bility.' 53 Any standards should take into account a country's
particular development stage. The economic growth of develop-
ing countries will be drastically affected if they are held ac-
countable to the same standards as developed countries. 54 Al-
together, because of the asset specificity, uncertainty, and
complexities involved in defining corporate human rights stan-
dards, an international organization should be charged with
promulgating the standards to be applied in particular circum-
stances. 155
150. Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 135, at 40 (using the modification of indi-
vidual state regulatory systems in the European Union as an example of a situation
of high asset specificity).
151. Id. at 41 (explaining that potential opportunism is the negative conse-
quence of an asset specific transaction, which in turn makes a binding mechanism
necessary).
152. Different corporations have different principles embodied in their codes.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
153. MAKOWER, supra note 20, at 33 (providing Japan as an example of a coun-
try that leaves the protection of social welfare to the government).
154. Lehrer, supra note 133, at 22 (stating that the developing countries insist
they cannot be held to the same standards as developed countries without a corre-
sponding infusion of capital and technology); see also Gerd Behrens, When Human
Rights and Profits Collide, TIME, Aug. 19, 1996 (stating that the growth of develop-
ing nations is contingent upon their ability to pollute at a higher level and lower
wages).
155. Id; c.f Frey, supra note 1, at 155 (declaring compliance with international
obligations is critical to the success of promoting human rights).
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C. THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
As the principal international organization dedicated to re-
solving international disputes, 156 the United Nations is the en-
tity best equipped to define human rights standards for corpora-
tions.157 The most important multilateral treaty that legally
binds almost every country is the UN Charter. 58 The Charter
defines the general human rights obligations of UN members. 159
The UN has also sponsored a number of international human
rights agreements such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) that further specify international human rights
obligations. 160 Because the UDHR and other UN agreements
bind governments who have ratified the instrument and not
corporations, the link between the expounded principles and
corporations is unclear.' 6' The connection between business and
human rights, however, is established. 162
The UN has recognized that despite the initiative of many
corporations in formulating their own codes of conduct, a great
deal of work remains in defining businesses' human rights obli-
gations. 163 To aid in this effort, in 1999, the UN instituted the
Global Compact. 164 The goal of the Global Compact is to "ad-
vance implementation of universally agreed values that are
relevant to business, to promote global corporate citizenship and
to stimulate best practices." 65 A distinguishing feature of the
156. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 455 (1991).
157. Frey, supra note 1, at 158 (stating that the UN faces pressure to regulate
the behavior of non-state actors such as corporations); see also Erb-Leoncavallo, su-
pra note 12 (reporting that the International Chamber of Commerce believes that
relevant UN agencies and programs should be responsible for promoting human
rights and labor standards); Joshua Karliner & Kenny Bruno, The United Nations
Sits in Suspicious Company, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug. 10, 2000 (de-
claring that the UN "is the only potential countervailing force to a brand of global-
ization that puts profits before people and the environment").
158. Id. at 869.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Frey, supra note 1, at 163 (noting that these types of covenants do not di-
rectly regulate corporations).
162. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text (how powerful corporations
are and how they have more power than governments).
163. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Business and Hu-
man Rights: An Update, available at www.unhchr.ch/businesupdate.htm (July 26,
2000).
164. Global Compact Web Site Links, UN, Business, Civil Society with Simulta-
neous Launch in New York, Davos, M2 Presswire, Jan. 31, 2000, available at 2000
WL 4798400.
165. Id.
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Compact is that it is the result of the collaboration of the UN,
business, labor and civil society.166 The Compact details nine
human rights, labor, and environmental principles for corpora-
tions to promote and apply.167 The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Labor Organization's Funda-
mental Principles on Rights at Work, and the Rio Principles on
the Environment provide the substance for the nine princi-
ples. 168 The Compact is not a code of conduct, but it does ask
corporations to do three things: (1) issue a clear statement of
support and engage in public advocacy for the Global Compact
and its principles; (2) post once a year on the Global Compact
website a concrete example of progress made or lessons learned
in implementing the principles; and (3) engage in partnership
with UN organizations by undertaking activities that further
the implementation of the principles, or by entering strategic
partnerships in support of broad UN goals such as poverty
eradication.169
The Global Compact is an excellent start to defining the
human rights obligations of corporations. Because the Compact
takes into account the perspectives of corporations along with
non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders, it is
more likely that corporations would adhere to its principles.
Yet, the Compact's principles are not legally binding. 170 There is
no system in place to publicly report or sanction deviant corpo-
rations.171 Even UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has repeat-
edly stated "voluntary initiatives of this kind are no substitute
for effective government action or international agreements."72
Annan's statement implies that even he realizes that uniform,
comprehensive, legally effective standards will be the most ef-
fective in not only defining a corporation's human rights respon-
sibilities but also ensuring adherence to such standards. Due to
its established presence in international affairs and the rela-
tionship it has built with business, the UN is in an excellent po-
166. See The Global Compact, Executive Summary and Conclusion, available at
www.un.org/partners/business/gcevent/press/summary.htm (last visited November
10, 2000).
167. See id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Karliner & Bruno, supra note 157.
171. Id. (further stating that the corporation can violate the Global Compact yet
continue to benefit).
172. John Ruggie, UN's Global Compact, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
Aug. 16, 2000.
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sition to capitalize upon the success of the Global Compact and
go one step further to set legally binding standards for corpora-
tions. Such standards would ensure a level playing field for cor-
porations doing business in the global economy and further the
promotion and protection of human rights.
III. CONCLUSION
Corporations should have a responsibility to protect and
promote human rights. However, the definition of these respon-
sibilities through adoption of voluntary codes of conduct should
not be left to the corporations themselves, because the incentive
to make a profit and remain competitive will potentially per-
suade a corporation to disregard the principles within such a
code. An international organization such as the United Nations
must promulgate the human rights standards by which compa-
nies shall abide, and the standards must have legal effect. Only
through such efforts will human rights truly be safeguarded
from corporate exploitation.
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